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– This study explores problems in the area of cross-bor-
der labour mobility and suggests that fair working con-
ditions in the Single Market could be enhanced by 
the establishment of a European Labour Authority.
– The main problem is that the competence of na-
tional authorities to control and enforce national la-
bour standards ends at the border. Thus, new 
forms of regulatory arbitrage, regime shopping 
and the evasion of existing labour standards can-
not be effectively monitored and sanctioned. 
– The author suggests that a European Labour 
Authority should legitimise and facilitate cross-bor-
der cooperation between national competent au-
thorities. The main task should be to solve disputes 
in case of infringements and breaches related to la-
bour mobility and/or cross-border recruitment. 
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INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s Single Market project seeks to en-
sure the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
citizens. The principle of free movement of workers is en-
shrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). Mobile EU28 citizens move 
mainly for employment-related reasons, and labour mo-
bility within the framework of cross-border provision of 
services has increased over time.1 However, most of the 
instruments that can be used to verify the lawfulness of 
mobility practices face limited national competences. This 
makes it difficult to effectively tackle abuses of current 
regulations, cases of fraud and failure to respect work-
ers’ rights, in particular in cross-border posting situations. 
Against this background, European Commission president 
Juncker, in his State of the Union Address at the European 
Parliament in 2017, announced plans for a European 
Labour Authority, tasked with ensuring that EU rules on 
labour mobility are enforced fairly, simply and effectively.
Juncker grounded the establishment of such an au-
thority on the growing mobility of workers in the EU, 
large-scale transnational commuting and the substan-
tial increase in the free movement of citizens for rea-
sons of business, family or tourism. He promised to 
come up with a proposal to establish such a European 
Labour Authority by March 2018. The creation of the 
European Labour Authority should strengthen coop-
eration between labour market authorities at all lev-
els and lead to the better management of cross-border 
situations, as well as to further initiatives in support 
of fair mobility, such as a European Social Security.
This brief study discusses some of the challenges that 
competent authorities active in the area of compliance 
control and enforcement are currently facing in European 
labour markets. Section 1 sets the scene and describes the 
current problems concerning the control and enforcement 
1 In 2015, almost 11.3 million EU28 citizens and 168,000 EFTA citizens of 
working age were residing in a member state other than their country of cit-
izenship, totalling some 11,434,000 people. This was an increase of 5.3 per 
cent compared with 2014. The total number of workers temporarily active 
abroad in 2015, measured on the basis of the overall number of A1-forms 
issued to persons insured in a member state other than the member state of 
(temporary) employment, increased by roughly 7 per cent, reaching a total of 
2.05 million (European Commission 2016 and 2017).
of labour mobility. The section draws on insights from  
different research projects that have explored the difficul-
ties faced by labour inspectorates and other compliance 
services. Section 2 provides a brief overview of possible 
sources for delineating the mandate of a European Labour 
Authority. A broad range of national practices exist in the 
area of control and enforcement of labour law legislation. 
The mandate of a European Labour Authority should be 
compatible with the variety of labour inspection systems 
already existing in the member states, in order to guaran-
tee proper application of the prevailing regulatory, legis-
lative and conventional framework of labour legislation 
and working conditions.2 ILO Convention No. 81 on la-
bour inspectorates, which all EU member states have rat-
ified, is therefore a good starting point. Section 2 also 
outlines institutions that have already been established 
at the EU level to enhance cooperation between national 
authorities in the field of labour law enforcement and 
shows that these institutions lack teeth. The final sec-
tion provides a series of reflections on the main tasks, 
competences and structure of the planned authority.
2  In this context »conventional« refers to the agreements (and other out-
comes) concluded by management and labour in collective bargaining and 
other autonomous negotiation processes. These bargaining results are seen 
by the author as the conventional part of the regulatory framework for the 
protection of all workers who pursue activities in a given territory.
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The European Commission proposes that a European 
Labour Authority should have three main tasks:
(i)  increased cooperation between national administrations; 
(ii)  combining existing instruments of cross-bor-
der labour mobility; and 
(iii) organising joint transnational control activities to 
fight breaches of labour and social legislation. 
Concerning practical experiences in these fields so far, 
there are a variety of problems encountered in control 
and enforcement activities at national level, as soon as a 
transnational dimension comes into play. More specifi-
cally, loopholes in control and enforcement procedures 
are a major problem. Given the exploratory charac-
ter of this paper, the description will be brief and refer-
ence will be made to other sources for more details.
1.1 FIRST PROBLEM: REGIME SHOPPING,  
REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND CROSS- 
BORDER RECRUITMENT AS A LABOUR 
COST-SAVING METHOD
If the aim of the European Labour Authority is to help 
strengthen cooperation between labour market authori-
ties at all levels and to improve management of cross-bor-
der mobility, the relevant »playing field« can be found in the 
regulatory framework for working and living conditions that 
applies in situations of cross-border mobility. On one hand, 
competences to decide on and control compliance with the 
regulatory framework of pay and working conditions stem 
from and are related to principles and rights enshrined in 
EU and national legislation (in the labour, social security 
and fiscal domains). On the other hand, these competences 
are related to provisions in agreements resulting from col-
lective bargaining. This has been extensively analysed and 
discussed in research and assessments (Cremers 2016).
There is evidence that the demand for cheap labour 
has contributed to new forms of regulatory arbitrage in 
Europe, characterised by regime-shopping and the evasion 
of existing legal and conventional frameworks to the detri-
ment of working conditions. Partly this is the result of the 
creation of a Single Market, with primacy given to economic 
freedoms binding across the EU, while the control (and en-
forcement) of labour legislation and working conditions has 
a mandate that usually ends at national borders. The gen-
eral experience is that, as soon as a transnational dimen-
sion is introduced into labour market relations, compliance 
control is hampered. In recent decades, this has been mani-
fest in several industries, first and foremost labour-intensive 
industries such as construction, manufacturing, shipbuild-
ing, transport and logistics, but more recently also in all 
kinds of services. The use of a foreign (artificial) entity in a 
cross-border context can lead to the introduction of ques-
tionable forms of labour recruitment, with blurred labour 
relations, the circumvention of social security payments and 
tax evasion. Freedom of establishment and the free provi-
sion of services in this context provide a breeding ground 
for artificial arrangements (such as »letterbox« compa-
nies), as these freedoms provide an unrestricted entrance 
to the EU member states’ labour markets (ETUC 2016).
In practice, this becomes manifest in:
–  the use of cheaper conventional frameworks (non- 
binding agreements or collective agreements that  
have a softer regime of employers’ contributions);
– the circumvention of (mandatory) employer contribu tions 
to industry-wide provisions and funds (vocational train-
ing, OSH and other social policy and protection funds);
– the »flagging-out« or conversion of agency work into 
the provision of services (no wage related costs, only  
invoices); and 
– the introduction of chains of cross-border subcontract - 
ing and/or foreign subsidiaries. 
The problem arises as soon as this cross-border la-
bour-only subcontracting is presented as »provision of ser-
vices«. In this situation, the freedom to provide services 
1 
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with posted workers creates an opening for forms of re-
cruitment that were never intended by the legislators. This 
is especially the case when companies externalise the re-
cruitment of labour to small subcontractors, leading to the 
use of agencies, gang masters and other intermediaries 
that act as go-betweens for workers and user undertak-
ings or specialised subcontractors. Distortion of the la-
bour market as a result is potentially substantial and, for 
instance, the posting of workers within the framework of 
the free provision of services has become a channel for 
the cross-border provision of cheap labour in the Single 
Market while evading the equal treatment that can be de-
rived from the EU legislation on free movement of workers.
Similarly, employers make cost savings on social secu-
rity by hiring workers from low-contribution countries for 
employment in countries with high social security contribu-
tions, in compliance with EU law. The so-called A1-form is 
a declaration that the worker in question is insured in the 
country of registration, thereby suggesting that their em-
ployment is perfectly legal. However, the use of an A1-form 
and resort to posting (even if it is just suggested) can ham-
per investigation and control of regulatory compliance. It 
requires verification in the country of registration, which is 
time-consuming, as well as the establishment of a work-
ing relationship with foreign authorities. Pay-related tax-sav-
ing methods take a number of forms, often combined with 
other cost saving methods. Low wages lead to lower payroll 
tax, while undeclared or untaxed allowances and other net 
payments diminish total tax costs, both income related and 
corporate. Fiscal engineering and lack of clarity about where 
turnover is realised offer additional methods to lower corpo-
rate tax. In this area the use of foreign subsidiaries is »per-
fectly legal« and, indeed, has become »business as usual«.
Recent research in the Netherlands on the enhanced 
control and enforcement of labour standards and working 
conditions underlines the problematic relationship between 
the working conditions of workers involved in temporary 
cross-border activities and the free provision of services 
(Cremers 2017). The assessment focused on the results of a 
campaign launched in the Netherlands after the 2013 social 
pact. In this pact, the social partners and the government de-
cided to enhance their cooperation in the campaign against 
letterbox companies and in the control and enforcement of 
collective agreements and mandatory working conditions. 
The assessed files provided evidence that cross-border re-
cruitment is often used as a labour cost–cutting method, 
with savings on direct wage costs resulting from partial or 
non-compliance with established standards. The breaches 
found were not restricted to wages and working conditions. 
The assessment gave clear indications of similar questionable 
practices in contiguous policy areas (social security, taxation).
1.2 SECOND PROBLEM:  
BLURRED COMPETENCES
Conflicting rules, spread over different policy areas, le-
gal complexity and the fragmentation of mandates ham-
per effective compliance and enforcement activities and 
therefore favour the emergence of unreliable actors. This 
situation undermines legal certainty, effective monitor-
ing and rule enforcement, to the detriment of bona-fide 
cross-border mobile workers and genuine service providers.3
Concerted action by the compliance and enforcement 
authorities is a key factor in the fight against fraudulent 
practises involving cross-border labour. Effective and com-
prehensive inspection initiatives must be ensured. The so-
cial partners (and related industry-wide institutions) can 
be seen as essential stakeholders in this overall policy ap-
proach. This applies even more to the pursuit of perma-
nent change in the perception of fraud in terms of costs 
and benefits by both citizens and businesses. Competences 
to control and decide on compliance in the cross-bor-
der recruitment of labour with the regulatory framework 
for pay and working conditions, as enshrined in collec-
tive agreements and labour legislation, should be allo-
cated more to the territory where the work is performed. 
Clarity of competences is relevant in order to enable au-
thorities to work effectively; this requires a reassess-
ment and upgrading of the »lex loci laboris« principle.4 
A series of projects led by the French Institut National 
du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle 
(INTEFP) aimed to improve transnational administrative coop-
eration between the relevant public authorities and collab-
oration with the social partners. The INTEFP projects, based 
on exchanges between the inspectorate, the social part-
ner organisations, liaison offices and other relevant national 
actors, underlined the necessity of enhanced cooperation 
between all stakeholders (public and competent bodies, so-
cial partners). This enhanced cooperation is relevant before 
cross-border activities start and in the period of perfor-
mance in the host country (and, in case of breaches, even 
after the activity has ended). Related to the posting of work-
ers, within the framework of free service provision, the pro-
ject showed that control of the regularity (or lawfulness) of 
posting and the collection of evidence and supporting doc-
uments were hindered by fragmented competences and a 
lack of mandate in the host country. Deficient competences 
became manifest as soon as an attempt was made to frame 
activities, rightly or wrongly, in terms of cross-border mo-
bility under freedom of establishment (in another constitu-
ency), freedom of contract and freedom to provide services.5 
One key joint frustration for competent institutions, and 
in fact for all stakeholders in these investigations, is the dif-
ficulty of bringing breaches of the law to justice. Research 
in the Netherlands, cited beyond (Cremers 2017), on the 
enhanced control and enforcement of labour standards 
and working conditions points to the crucial significance 
3 A good overview of the dispersed competences can be found in a hand-
book produced by the Senior Labour Inspectors’ Committee (2016).
4 The lex loci laboris principle encompasses the notion that economically 
active persons are subject to the labour legislation and working conditions 
of the country in which they are carrying out their work, even if they are 
residents of another country.
5 INTEFP’s mission is enshrined in French law (decree 2005-1555, Decem-
ber 2005). Besides its main task – the training of the labour inspectorate 
– INTEFP is tasked with initiating national and international partnerships that 
are relevant for the work of the inspectorate.
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of competences and the operational mandate of the ac-
tors and institutions involved. Participants in the INTEFP 
project often concluded, once irregularities were de-
tected, that an accumulation of breaches and circumven-
tion was the rule rather than the exception. Enforcement 
and compliance offices had to deal with competence prob-
lems and related legal and operational difficulties in seek-
ing to trace circumvention in cross-border situations, 
besides the weakness of the existing sanction mecha-
nisms. This raises the question of where competence lies 
for the overall compliance control of the rules concerning 
cross-border provision of services using posted workers.6 
No allocation of transnational competences in the so-
cial field is regulated at EU level. The European legislator 
has monitored free service provision from the perspective 
of whether national conditions could become a »barrier« 
to business. On the other hand, a workforce confronted by 
non-genuine service providers that circumvent national con-
ditions is not seen as an EU responsibility. The EU (and the 
member states) always refer in such cases to national com-
petences. However, in the research of the practical cases 
cited here it appears that the activities of most competent 
national authorities in the social field end at the border, as 
the mandate of control and enforcement institutions is lim-
ited to the national territory. The competence to check the 
reliability of documents that underpin the cross-border ac-
tivity and, if necessary, to withdraw these documents, is 
missing. As most cases stem from situations based on EU 
internal market rules – such as freedom of establishment 
and the free provision of services – a EU-legitimised man-
date conferred on competent authorities across the EU, 
irrespective of being located in the sending or the receiv-
ing country would seem much more appropriate. In or-
der to establish such an EU competence, more horizontal 
transnational cooperation across all relevant policy areas 
is of the utmost importance and this has to be combined 
with a broadening of the mandate to act transnationally.
1.3 THIRD PROBLEM: LACK OF A 
EUROPEAN COMPLAINTS MECHANISM
There is scarcely any complaint or redress mechanism in the 
social field concerning the internal market rules that regulate 
the economic freedoms. There is nothing comparable to, 
for instance, the procedures in the competition field where 
the Commission has to initiate proceedings for detecting in-
fringements of competition rules, as well as the handling 
of complaints and the hearing of the parties concerned.7 
Problematic for all stakeholders in a compliance cam-
paign with cross-border elements is the lack of effective 
sanctions. Fines are weak in an extra-territorial context and 
most countries have no specific punitive enforcement in-




7 See, for instance, Council Regulation (EC) No 773/2004.
actors. The fact that the tackling of fraudulent cross-border 
labour recruitment very often comes too late or that these 
practices can pop up repeatedly, leads to serious frustra-
tions among the institutions concerned. The legal instru-
ments of the national compliance offices do not include 
sanctions such as the withdrawal or deregistration of estab-
lishments. Moreover, in the EU social fraud is still not consid-
ered a major offense that can justify Europe-wide sanctions.
Compliance offices often detect firms that are ac-
tive in several countries, using the same methods, while 
their presence in the country of registration is only sym-
bolic.8 This calls for cooperation in control and compliance 
activities, but also in the enactment and implementa-
tion of sanctions. Effective measures are needed in or-
der to promote genuine operations and prevent abuses. 
Fake entities should be refused entrance to the market (for 
example, by withdrawing licenses and certificates or ex-
clusion from public procurement bids). Sanctions need 
to have an EU-wide effect in order to prevent bogus ac-
tors from starting all over again in other jurisdictions.
One key element missing at EU level is the possibility for 
the social partners, who are ultimately the bearers and initi-
ators of collectively agreed wages and working conditions, 
8 There is a website that provides a long list of firms notorious for these 
practices: http://www.stoppafusket.se/. See also: www.rte.ie/news/play-
er/2014/1106/20677365-the-treatment-of-foreign-workers-by-irish-firms/.
An example of a business model
The social partners and the inspectorate have in sev-
eral studies (Lanove 2013, INTEFP 2013, ETUC 2016) 
reported the appearance of artificial legal entities, 
established for the purpose of subcontracting work 
to one or more countries. The phenomenon has be-
come associated with a cheap labour business model: 
letterbox companies that operate in a cross-bor-
der context and select the social security and labour 
standards regime that is the least regulated and most 
profitable. Ownership and employer liabilities are ob-
scured or blurred by using proxy owners or strawmen. 
The workers often work under the direct supervision 
of the user undertaking, thus creating a situation of 
bogus subcontracting or illicit provision of labour. 
The possibility of tackling dubious subcontract-
ing practices that obstruct enforcement and redress 
is extremely weak. These entities take advantage of 
limited inspection competences and a lack of trans-
national enforcement mechanisms to deprive work-
ers of their wages and contributions. In practice, 
cross-border recruitment through fictitious owner-
ship prevents states from reinforcing employment 
and labour standards. Such artificial arrangements 
pop up and disappear as soon as investigations 
start. In this way, people liable for bogus activi-
ties can bypass proper control and enforcement. 
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to intervene and to be heard in disputes with a cross-bor-
der character. Most member states have set up a range of 
parity-based, sectoral or interprofessional committees with 
a mandate to step in as soon as there is an industrial dis-
pute or differences in interpreting agreements and other 
concluded provisions. These joint bodies are usually com-
posed of representatives of management and labour, and 
have the task of preventing, resolving and settling disputes 
and conflicts. Social partners have established compliance 
institutions and counselling offices and cooperate in tar-
geted campaigns. Just like the compliance authorities es-
tablished by the national legislator, the mandate of these 
bodies ends at the national border. There are no institution-
alised procedures that can deal with industrial disputes of 
a cross-border nature. Given also that this does not belong 
among the tasks of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, there is no arbitration or labour dispute resolving in-
stitution at transnational level that can intervene effectively.
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Across the European Union, there is a broad range of na-
tional practices in the area of control and enforcement of 
labour market regulation. Therefore, it is not easy to de-
scribe a common denominator of these institutions. The 
responsible and competent national organisations in the 
member states encompass different types of labour in-
spectorate and other compliance and enforcement in-
stitutions (varying from liaison offices with relatively 
little authority or institutions with limited task prescrip-
tions – for instance, restricted to OHS matters – to bod-
ies with very broadly defined operational tasks). Several 
member states have established arbitration offices, la-
bour courts or other specialised entities that can intervene 
in industrial disputes and conflicts. It would certainly be 
worthwhile to study these national practices in more de-
tail. However, for reasons of space the study focuses on 
transnational sources that can provide a benchmark.
Interesting reference can be made to the ILO, espe-
cially in the area of the monitoring of labour legislation 
and collective agreements. All EU member states have rat-
ified the ILO Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 
81).9  Convention No. 81 requires ratifying states to main-
tain a system of labour inspection for workplaces in in-
dustry and commerce and sets out a series of principles 
concerning the fields of legislation to be covered by la-
bour inspection. The convention also defines the func-
tions and organisations of the system of inspection, and 
the powers and obligations of the inspectorate. Basic el-
ements of the work of the inspectorate can be found in 
this Convention. Labour inspectors examine the applica-
tion of legal provisions related to conditions of work and 
the protection of workers while engaged in their work. 
The defined primary duty of the inspectorate is to secure 
the enforcement of legal (and conventional) provisions, 
9 Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), Convention concerning 
Labour Inspection in Industry and Commerce. The flanking Protocol of 1995 
that extends the application of Convention No. 81 to non-commercial work-
places, has been ratified by only six EU member states. Labour Inspection 
(Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129) that, similar in content to Conven-
tion No. 81, requires ratifying states to establish and maintain a system of 
labour inspection in agriculture has been ratified by 21 member states.
to provide advice to employers and workers on such mat-
ters as working time, wages, occupational safety and 
health, and child labour, and to notify the authorities con-
cerning defects and/or abuses. Labour inspectors serve as 
an antenna for national authorities with regard to loop-
holes and defects in the national regulatory framework.10 
Also relevant in this context is the fact that the 
Convention talks about appropriate arrangements that 
have to be made to promote effective cooperation be-
tween the inspection services and other government ser-
vices and public or private institutions engaged in similar 
activities, and collaboration between officials of the labour 
inspectorate and employers and workers or their organ-
isations. The inspectorate shall be empowered to freely 
enter, without prior notice, any workplace liable to inspec-
tion and to carry out any examination considered to be 
necessary. The inspectorate shall be empowered to take 
steps with a view to remedying observed defects, vary-
ing from orders requiring alterations to immediate execu-
tory force in the event of serious danger. Violations can be 
tackled by warnings, the prescription of remedial or pre-
ventive measures or legal proceedings, with adequate and 
effective penalties provided for by national laws or reg-
ulations. In the Convention, the term »legal provisions« 
includes, in addition to laws and regulations, arbitration 
awards and collective agreements on which the force of 
law is conferred and which are enforceable by labour in-
spectors. The wording of Convention No. 81 is clear about 
territory; it addresses national authorities. Neither trans-
national nor supranational proceedings are envisaged. 
However, with ratification by all member states, the inten-
tions of the Convention could be a good starting point.
10 One of the basic principles of the European social model is respect for 
the regulatory labour market framework that exists in the member states. 
This regulatory framework for the protection of workers can consist of 
the national labour legislation and other labour market–related legal acts. 
However, in most countries, the framework is a mixture of labour legislation 
and (the outcomes of) collective bargaining. As the composition of the mix 
is different in every country, European policies impacting labour market 
and social policies have to recognise and deal with that diversity. Collective 
bargaining as such is a constitutional right in the European Union’s body of 
law (enshrined in the acquis communautaire).
2 
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The European Parliament has, on several occasions, for-
mulated its thoughts about more effective inspections. 
In January 2014 the European Parliament adopted a res-
olution on effective labour inspections to improve work-
ing conditions in Europe (European Parliament 2014) with 
proposals for a new strategy, including a recommenda-
tion to introduce a European agency dealing with all kinds 
of cross-border matters within the field of labour inspec-
tion. Although the explanatory statement of the EP re-
port focuses strongly on the phenomenon of undeclared 
labour, the recommendations are formulated against the 
more general background of problems faced by labour in-
spectorates in the EU. The rapporteur not only lays down 
principles for effective labour inspections in the mem-
ber states, but also highlights policy recommendations to 
promote cross-border cooperation between national au-
thorities, combined with legal initiatives to strengthen 
the role of labour inspections. In summary, the European 
Parliament stresses the role of cooperation between an in-
dependent inspectorate and the social partners; the re-
port also points to the responsibility of the inspectorate 
for all workers within its territory and asks for the devel-
opment of inspection methods in line with Convention 
No. 81, with effective and dissuasive sanctions.
Several recommendations are directly linked to the 
transnational or cross-border dimension. The European 
Parliament suggested the establishment of a European plat-
form for labour inspectors on undeclared work in order to 
facilitate the exchange of experiences and good practices; 
to provide up-to-date, objective, reliable and comparative 
information; to enhance cross-border cooperation; and to 
identify and keep a record of letterbox companies and sim-
ilar operations. It calls on the Commission to devote ade-
quate human resources for cross-border matters concerning 
the abuse of employment protection rules and undeclared 
work – with a remit including, inter alia, the identification 
of letterbox companies and the control of transnational 
service providers – and to develop EU-wide further-train-
ing programmes for inspectorates that address challenges 
such as bogus self-employment and posting, the identifi-
cation of new ways of circumventing the rules and the or-
ganisation of cross-border controls and inspections. The 
European Parliament is aware of the limited competences 
of inspectorates in cross-border situations and calls on the 
Commission and the member states to ensure that labour 
inspections can make full use of their right to non-dis-
criminatory independent inspections in cross-border situ-
ations, regardless of a company’s place of establishment.
In this overview reference has to be made to three in-
stitutions at European level: the Senior Labour Inspectors’ 
Committee (SLIC), the Administrative Commission (on the 
Coordination of Social Security Systems) and the European 
Platform Tackling Undeclared Work. The principal role of 
all three is to promote enhanced cooperation between 
national competent authorities. The initiatives have re-
stricted competences, limited to the exchange of infor-
mation and the signalling of defects and frictions.11 
11 Reference can be made to the tradition of cross-border cooperation in 
other areas based on EU legislation, such as food and consumer rights. EU 
consumer policy has a longer tradition, with sanctions that have to be effec-
tive, dissuasive and proportionate. Cooperation between member states has, 
for instance, to ensure that they require the cessation of illegal practices by 
operators in their territory who target consumers in another member state. 
The Commission coordinates common actions to address EU-wide prob-
lematic practices and promotes cooperation between national competent 
authorities to ensure that consumer rights legislation is applied and enforced 
consistently across the Single Market. Moreover, the national consumer 
authorities have the possibility, if there is a cross-border aspect to a breach, 
to address it through the Consumer Protection Cooperation network at the 
European level.
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– Other government services
– Public and private institutions engaged in similar activities
Competences
– Limited to national territory
– All investigation considered necessary 
– Right to enter sites
– Initiatives to remedy
– Executory power
Tasks
– Examine workplace-related cases
– Enforce rights
– Remedy of observed defects
– Advise employers and employees
– Inform and notify legislator
Sanctions
– Warnings




(i)  The Senior Labour Inspectors’ Committee (SLIC) started 
to meet informally in 1982 to assist the European 
Commission in monitoring the enforcement of EU leg-
islation at the national level. A Commission Decision 
(95/319/EC) gave the Committee formal status in 1995 
with a mandate to give its opinion to the Commission, 
either at the Commission’s request or on its own in-
itiative, on all problems related to the enforcement 
by the member states of Community law on health 
and safety at work. In principle, this means that SLIC 
has the task of formulating common principles of la-
bour inspection, restricted to the field of health and 
safety at work. Over time, some SLIC activities have 
been extended to, for instance, the broader analy-
sis of working conditions for posted workers. SLIC 
has neither operational tasks nor executive power.
(ii) The Administrative Commission (on the Coordination 
of Social Security Systems) deals with interpretative and 
administrative controversies arising from the social se-
curity coordination regulations. The commission fa-
cilitates a uniform application of the EU legislation, in 
particular by promoting exchange of experience and 
best practices. It fosters and develops cooperation be-
tween member states in social security matters and 
helps parties to reach agreements on questions of prin-
ciple that arise between the member states. The com-
mission is composed of a government representative of 
each member state, assisted, where necessary, by ex-
perts. The commission discusses the need for amend-
ments to the coordination regulations and formulates 
proposals to the European Commission with a view to 
improving and modernising the legislation. Its interpre-
tative decisions and recommendations are published 
in the Official Journal of the EU. Although the deci-
sions are formally not legally binding, member states are 
bound by decisions they have adopted and must fol-
low them, based on the principle of good cooperation.
(iii) The European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work, es-
tablished by Decision (EU) 2016/3441, brings together 
relevant authorities and actors involved in fighting un-
declared work. The Platform provides different actors, 
including social partners and enforcement authori-
ties, such as labour inspectorates, tax and social se-
curity authorities, with activities that promote the 
Excursion to the land of »free enterprise«
One transnational territorial situation that is particularly 
worth mentioning is the approach to inspection in the 
United States. There is a wide variety of voluntary, coop-
erative provisions and compliance and enforcement prac-
tices in the different US states. In 1998, for instance, the 
United States adopted the Strategic Partnership Program 
for Worker Safety and Health. With this programme, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration en-
tered into an extended, voluntary relationship with 
groups of employers, employees and employee repre-
sentatives in order to encourage, assist and recognise 
their efforts to eliminate serious hazards and achieve 
a high level of safety and health in the workplace. 
In another policy area, the Davis-Bacon Act, amended 
in 2002, lays down that prevailing wages have to be 
respected in a state in which work is performed. The 
Act formulates clear sanctions across the whole of the 
US in case of non-compliance, for example, the distri-
bution of a list of persons found to have disregarded 
their obligations to employees and subcontractors and 
their exclusion from public contracts for three years. 
The Wages Act and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, re-
cordkeeping and youth employment stand-
ards affecting employees in the private sector 
and in Federal, State and local governments. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides the legal 
framework for the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), an 
office created in the Department of Labor, led by the 
Administrator who is appointed by the President, by and  
 
 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The WHD 
is responsible for administering and enforcing some of 
the most important worker protection laws. Workers 
can file a complaint at one of the 200 WHD offices. 
The principal office of the Administrator is in the  
District of Columbia, but they or their duly authorised  
representative may exercise any or all of their powers  
in any place at federal level. The Administrator or des- 
ignated representatives may investigate and gather  
data regarding wages, hours and other conditions 
and practices of employment, and may enter and in- 
spect such places and such records (and make tran- 
scriptions thereof), question such employees, and in- 
vestigate such facts, conditions, practices or matters 
as they may deem necessary or appropriate to deter- 
mine whether any person has violated any provision,  
or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions. 
With some exceptions, the Administrator uti-
lises the bureaus and divisions of the Department of 
Labor for all necessary investigations and inspections. 
With the consent and cooperation of State agencies 
charged with the administration of State labour laws, 
the Administrator and the Secretary of Labor may, for 
the purpose of carrying out their respective functions 
and duties, utilise the services of State and local agen-
cies and their employees and, notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, may reimburse such State and lo-
cal agencies and their employees for services rendered 
for such purposes. This means that the Administrator 
can act beyond the level of the individual US state.
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exchange of information and good practices, the de-
velopment of knowledge and evidence and engage-
ment in closer cross-border cooperation, through staff 
exchanges and joint projects. Its objectives are to con-
tribute to more effective EU and national actions aimed 
at improving working conditions, promoting integra-
tion in the labour market and social inclusion, including 
better enforcement of law within those fields, reduc-
ing undeclared work and promoting the emergence 
of formal jobs. The Platform – which is still in its ini-
tial stages – seeks to encourage and facilitate innova-
tive approaches to effective and efficient cross-border 
cooperation, to evaluate experiences and to contrib-
ute to a horizontal understanding of relevant matters. 
A common denominator of the three institutions is 
the lack of executive and operational powers. The 
Administrative Committee has some legislative com-
petences with regard to its explanatory decisions and 
recommendations related to possible problems of in-
terpretation with regard to the Regulations for coor-
dinating social security. Overall, however, there is little 
possibility for intervening in transnational issues.
The main activities of the three bodies are the ex-
change of information, the dissemination of good prac-
tices and the promotion of cooperation in selected areas. 
The focus is on one issue or aspect, although we have 
seen that the problematic aspects of labour mobility call 
for coordinated action across all relevant policy areas.
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG 12
The need for an authority that deals with labour mobility is 
almost self-evident, given the practical experiences and prob-
lems listed in the short summary in Section 1. Free movement 
will survive only if it is grounded on the principle of equal 
treatment in the territory where work is carried out. However, 
at present, national authorities are unable to meet their ob-
ligations as soon as transnational elements enter the picture. 
Cooperation is just one aspect of an effective remedy. It may 
also be mentioned that the existing institutions at European 
level – on one hand, the SLIC or the Undeclared Work plat-
form and on the other agencies such as Eurofound and the 
Bilbao Agency – have no opportunities to take real action.
3.1 MAIN TASKS
Problems related to labour mobility can be tackled effec-
tively only by an authorised institution with a mandate to ex-
ercise any or all of its powers across the EU. This is the most 
fundamental benefit that such an authority can provide. 
However, the functioning of the European Labour Authority 
will be effective and successful only if it is not overloaded. 
In its initial stage, the authority’s core task should be re-
stricted to infringements related to labour mobility and/
or cross-border recruitment, which find their origins in the 
functioning and application of the EU’s economic freedoms. 
The European Labour Authority should play a key role in the 
structural prevention and solving of problems and breaches 
originating from the relevant labour mobility acquis. An 
accumulation of different tasks and functions, however 
well motivated and valid, would frustrate the process and 
bear the risk that no task would be performed properly.
Tackling labour mobility problems and disputes has  
to be made operational through:
–  the establishment of arbitration procedures that can solve 
labour mobility frictions and related claims outside the 
courtroom;
– combining existing national instruments across all rel-
evant and intertwined policy areas (social legislation, 
binding collective agreements, social security and tax 
obligations), leading to complementary functioning in 
relation to existing national compliance bodies;
– the assessment of conflicting national and EU rules 
and interpretation problems, combined with an in-
depth analysis of the mechanisms underlying circum-
vention practices and similar breaches; 
– working towards recommendations to the European 
legislator in relevant domains of the Single Market 
and the Community acquis (freedom of establishment, 
free service provision, free choice of contract, com-
pany law);
– a clear division of labour with regard to the existing 
bodies (the Agencies, the Administrative Commission 
and the Platform on Undeclared Labour) and the 
European Labour Authority; and 
– access for the main stakeholders to infringement 
procedures at the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. 
The relationship with the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union is of particular importance when it comes 
to setting these tasks. The first priority is to settle dis-
putes by means of dialogue between the national stake-
holders (competent organisations and institutions of the 
member states, social partners and other bodies with a 
legitimate interest in the cessation or prohibition of in-
tra-Community infringements). If they cannot reach 
agreement, it is open to them to refer the matter to the 
European Labour Authority. Without taking a stand in 
the debate on whether or not there should be a spe-
cial unit at the Court of Justice of the European Union 
for labour disputes, it would be appropriate to pro-
vide the European Labour Authority with the possibil-
ity of appealing directly to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for a decision, if the Authority is un-
able to reconcile the viewpoints or find a solution.
3 
TASKS, COMPETENCES AND STRUCTURE OF  
A EUROPEAN LABOUR AUTHORITY 
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3.2 COMPETENCES AND MANDATE
Barriers encountered in compliance activities at na-
tional level often arise from frictions between the exist-
ing juridical framework that the Single Market provides 
for service providers and foreign establishments and 
the limited territorial mandate of the competent au-
thorities. Existing national compliance arrangements 
that are supposed to protect workers’ interests are not 
adapted to the challenges of enforcement in the inter-
nal market. Effective and efficient enforcement coop-
eration is often complicated. So far, the EU has tried 
to tackle this in the field of labour and social policy 
with administrative cooperation (»mutual assistance«, 
»good faith«), without a strong mandate or legally 
binding obligations. The cooperation is »soft«, com-
pared with policy applied in handling possible abuses 
in trade, consumer protection or fiscal policies.12
The notion that the European Labour Authority would 
have to lead to enhanced cooperation is not controver-
sial. However, practical experiences with compliance ac-
tivities indicate that this is no guarantee of fair labour 
mobility. Different opinions and interpretations between 
member states or involved stakeholders, fragmented 
competences and too strong demarcations of man-
dates, as well as a lack of social considerations in parts 
of the internal market regulations (leading to no man-
date at all in relevant policy areas, such as company law) 
hinder the effective tackling of breaches and abuses. 
Therefore, the European Labour Authority should have a 
broad mandate to detect and investigate, with the com-
petence to take all necessary enforcement measures 
to bring about the cessation or prohibition of abuses. 
The authority should complement, monitor and super-
vise the activities of national compliance offices and 
instances. It must have the competence to set up or le-
gitimise joint inspections and to oblige member states 
to cooperate in these investigations, in cases where rele-
vant stakeholders bring claims forward or demand assis-
tance with compliance. This includes the competence to 
12 Directive 2006/123/EC (the Services Directive) gives some directions, 
where it says: »Administrative cooperation is essential to make the internal 
market in services function properly. Lack of cooperation between Member 
States results in proliferation of rules applicable to providers or duplication 
of controls for cross-border activities, and can also be used by rogue traders 
to avoid supervision or to circumvent applicable national rules on services. 
It is, therefore, essential to provide for clear, legally binding obligations for 
Member States to cooperate effectively« (consideration 105). Article 28.4 
of the Services Directive forces member states to »ensure that providers 
established in their territory supply their competent authorities with all the 
information necessary for supervising their activities in compliance with their 
national laws«. And Article 29.3 obliges member states of establishment, 
upon obtaining actual knowledge of any conduct or specific acts by a provid-
er established in its territory which provides services in other member states, 
that, to its knowledge, could cause serious damage to the health or safety 
of persons or to the environment, to inform all other member states and the 
Commission within the shortest possible period of time. Finally, Article 31.4 
provides a very broad mandate to the relevant host country authorities to 
check the service provider, asserting that the competent authorities may on 
their own initiative, conduct checks, inspections and investigations on the 
spot, provided that those checks, inspections or investigations are propor-
tionate, not discriminatory and not motivated by the fact that the provider is 
established in another member state.
initiate investigations that go beyond the strict compe-
tence limitations that exist in some member states in rel-
evant policy areas. This includes the capacity to launch 
and coordinate common actions to address problematic 
EU-wide practices in the Cross-border enforcement and 
cooperation (CPC) of consumer protection. In the CPC 
domain, organisations with an interest in consumer pro-
tection have the right to indicate bad cross-border prac-
tices to enforcers and to the European Commission.
Based on these investigations, the European Labour 
Authority should have the power to settle disputes 
through arbitration and, if necessary, by adopting bind-
ing decisions. Member states should be bound by these 
decisions and should follow them, with the right to ap-
peal to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The 
European Labour Authority must have the power to ask 
the Commission to start an infringement procedure (in 
case of violation of EU labour law). Monitoring should 
also lead to the formulation of possible amendments to 
the regulations that underpin the labour mobility in pro-
posals to the European Commission. It thus could con-
tribute to improving and modernising the legislation.
3.3 STRUCTURE
The establishment and structure of the European Labour 
Authority should do justice to the fact that the regula-
tory framework for fair labour mobility is built up, on the 
one hand, by the legislator (at national level often based 
on tripartite consultative or advisory structures), and on 
the other hand by the partners in collective bargaining. 
The supervision and enforcement of the legislative com-
ponent of this regulatory framework belongs to the com-
petent authorities, usually established and organised 
by the national legislator. The conventional component 
is based on collective bargaining between representa-
tives of management and labour, without direct interfer-
ence by the legislator. This is a strong argument against 
compulsory arbitration or conciliation and must be re-
flected in the design of the European Labour Authority.
The most logical structure of the European Labour 
Authority, therefore, would be to set up an office with  
two layers:
(i) A general committee that deals with frictions, dis-
putes and problems in the field of cross-border 
labour mobility that originate from lack of transpar-
ency or cooperation, and from different interpre-
tations of the legal part of the relevant acquis; 
the composition of this body should be tripartite.
(ii) A second committee (or chamber) dealing with 
frictions, disputes and problems in the field of 
cross-border labour mobility that origin in a lack 
of transparency or cooperation, and different in-
terpretations of the conventional part of the 
relevant rules and provisions; the composi-
tion of the committee should be bipartite. 
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3.4 OPEN QUESTION
In order to make this model work, consideration has  
to be given to the following:
– which relevant stakeholders can ask for activation of the 
authority?
– what happens in the event of non-compliance with bind-
ing decisions?
– should the European Labour Authority have executive 
power with direct punitive authority?
Finally, once more a parallel can be drawn with consumers’ 
rights in the internal market. Regulation 2006/2004 on co-
operation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection defines an »intra-Com-
munity infringement« as any act or omission contrary to 
the laws that protect consumers’ interests, that harms, or is 
likely to harm, the collective interests of consumers residing 
in a member state or member states other than the mem-
ber state where the act or omission originated or took place; 
or where the responsible seller or supplier is established; or 
where evidence or assets pertaining to the act or omission 
are to be found. National competent authorities responsible 
for consumer protection have the competence to require the 
cessation or prohibition of any intra-Community infringe-
ment and, where appropriate, to address resulting decisions 
to the European Commission and the other member states.
It seems logical to provide the competent authorities in 
the area of fair labour mobility with similar competences 
and facilities, under the supervision of the European Labour 
Authority.
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